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Elections, referenda and polls are vital processes for the 
operation of a modern democracy. They form the 
mechanism for transferring power from citizens to their 
representatives.  Although some commentators claim that 
the pencil-and-paper systems used in countries such as 
Canada and UK are still the best method of avoiding vote-
rigging, recent election problems, and the need for faster, 
better, cheaper vote counting, have stimulated great 
interest in managing the election process through the use 
of electronic voting systems. While computer scientists, 
for the most part, have been warning of the possible perils 
of such action, vendors have forged ahead with their 
products, claiming increased security and reliability. 
Many democracies have adopted electronic systems, and 
the number of deployed systems is rising. Although the 
electronic voting process has gained popularity and users, 
it is a great challenge to provide a reliable system. The 
existing systems available to perform the election tasks 
are far from trustworthy. In this paper we describe VEV 
(Verifiable E-Voting), an electronic voting system which 
is opne, but also provides for secret and secure voting, and 
can be used and verified over existing network system. 
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It is clearly desirable that the operation of our 
governments be transparent: we need to have trust in the 
work of our Nation State. In this paper we suggest that the 
adoption of Free/Libre and Open Source Software 
(FLOSS) as the primary software resource for key 
government responsibilities to ensure transparency and 
trust in such systems, in particular the electoral system,. In 
this paper we present a Verifiable Electronic Voting 
system that we have developed and released as FLOSS. 
[9]  
 
Today, nearly every government in the world wants to 
know more about free software and how the model works, 
and the private sector is not far behind. Some 
governments have already begun the task of migrating to 
the use of free software in the public sector. The free 
GNU/Linux operating system now rivals the dominance 
of Microsoft Windows in controlling how our computers 
and networks run, at least at an institutional level. For 
example, the Australian Government Information 
Management Office’s (AGIMO) recognises that the use of 
open source software is “particularly widespread in areas 
such as network infrastructure, single-purpose computer 
servers, security, Internet and intranet applications and 
network communications” in both the private and public 
sectors. [10] 
 
In Europe there has been a flurry of projects that are 
addressing the possibility of widespread adoption of Free 
Software. The FLOSS project (Free/Libre and Open 
Source Software) [1] ran from June 2001 for 16 months. It 
had European Commission funding to gather data on 
FLOSS use and development. The project was looking to 
find hard economic data on the effects of FLOSS 
contributions as a “non-monetary economic network”, the 
distribution patterns of such software, measuring 
contribution and use, business models, particularly change 
management.[2] The project was remarkable as the first of 
its kind to collect such empirical data on a large scale on 
FLOSS. Following FLOSS’s success at making an inroad 
into providing data on FLOSS, further EU projects have 
followed. FLOSS-POLS (Free/Libre/Open Source 
Software: Policy Support) [3] is a current project funded 
by the European Commission to analyse “government 
policy towards open source; gender issues in open source; 
and the efficiency of open source as a system for 
collaborative problem-solving…. [and] focus on studying 
the impact of policy and providing policy 
recommendations.”[4] By March 2005, FLOSS-POLS had 
surveyed 4,138 public authority IT administrators in 13 
European member states (excluding Hungary). The key 
outcomes of this survey are that they found 79% of those 
surveyed used some FLOSS, and that there is a desire for 
increased use amongst them. Also notable is the different 
countries showed different profiles.  
 
An electronic voting system provides the means for the 
election authorities to carry out the election process using 
computer-based technology. Although it brings ease to the 
voters and election candidates, computer scientists argue 
that voting on line is not safe, because the network, 
operating system, access, ore even hardware may have 
security flaws. [5] There has been very little in the way of 
workable voting system code release as FLOSS. 
 
Many voters already use some sort of computerized voting 
system. [6] Punch cards, like the ones used in USA 
presidential elections in 2000, are tallied by a 
computerized counting machine that detects the punched 
holes in a ballot. This form of voting has been used since 
the 1960’s [7]. Optical scanners are used for those voting 
systems that use paper and pen, to detect pen marks made 
on a ballot. Optical scan vote counters are not as old as 
punch card technology, but they seem somewhat archaic 
compared to other technologies that we use everyday. For 
many people, an electronic voting is the next logical step 
for elections.  
 
In Brazil and the Netherlands, many voters already use 
ATM-like machines to cast their vote. Using these 
machines, voters gather at their traditional voting precinct 
and cast their ballots in a kiosk, just like the one they have 
always used. This kiosk retains the privacy that voters 
want. Voters carry in a cartridge and place it in the e-
voting computer, which displays the candidates on a 
touch-screen, liquid-crystal display. Unlike paper ballots, 
these machines display information about each candidate 
aside from their party affiliation, and might even display 
the candidate's photo so that there is less confusion over 
identity. A voter makes his choice by touching the screen. 
Once the voter has completed the ballot, the computer 
allows the voter to review his or her choice before 
returning the cartridge to an election official.  
 
In an electronic voting process voters can simply point 
and click on the candidate they support. This type of 
voting has the potential to significantly increase voter 
turnout. In 1998, only 44.9 percent of Americans of voting 
age took the time to vote. According to [3] many non-
voters say that the inconvenience of registering or voting 
is the main reason they did not cast a ballot.   
 
Dill in [2] points out that unless the voting process is 
verifiable, it can not be trusted. In most of existing Direct 
Recording Electronic (DRE) voting machines the internal 
mechanics of voting are hidden from the voter. It is 
possible that a computer can easily display one set of 
votes to the voter while recording entirely different votes 
in electronic memory.  This can be caused by a 
programming error or by a malicious design of the system. 
Almost all of DRE machines currently used in USA 
require official certification, but the election officers are 
powerless to prevent programming errors in recording of 
the votes. DRE code is usually protected by code secrecy 
agreements, so no one but the manufacturer has access to 
it.  Dill et al. says that the only way to have a trusted 
electronic voting system is to include a voter-verifiable 
paper audit trail in all DRE voting machines. The voting 
system that is described in this report provides a secure 
way to count and to verify the votes.  
 
While computer scientists and critics in North America 
are concerned with the insecurity of electronic voting 
machines, Australians designed a voting system five years 
ago, and they made most of the source code of the 
underlying software available to the public [8].The system 
had to be implemented over a secure network (using 
independent connections). This requirement alone 
provides enormous difficulty to the election authorities in 
Australia. The state was able to test only 80 machines 
distributed among 8 polling stations in their 2002 election. 
 
 
2. The Task 
 
The design of a “good” voting system, whether electronic 
or using traditional paper ballots or mechanical devices 
must be robust against a wide variety of potentially 
fraudulent behavior. The following voting system 
requirements were born out of the desire to create a 
product that would allow modern computer-based 
technology to truly emulate the secure properties as 
valued in the public voting. The purpose of this project is 
to make it impossible for voting authorities to engage in a 
fraudulent behaviour, and at the same time the system will 
provide the secrecy for the voters. VEV has been an 
attempt to provide a voting system that would be: 
 
1. anonymous - no one should be able to determine how 
any individual  voted  
2. secret    - all cast votes should be unknown until the 
election ends 
3. correct  -  It should not be possible for a vote to be 
altered, or for a valid vote to be eliminated from the 
final tally, or for an invalid vote  to be counted in the 
final tally 
4. honest   -  no one should be able to vote twice or 
change the vote of another voter 
5. public   -   after an election all results should 
publicly known, but the connection between votes and 
the voters should be both unprovable and unknown 
Critics of the electronic voting systems say that the voters 
who use them have no way to verify that their votes are 
being recorded and counted accurately. In case of an 
electronic system the only known solution to this problem 
is to introduce a “voter-verifiable audit trail”. Most 
commonly, this is achieved by adding a printer to the 
voting terminal. When the voter finishes selecting 
candidates, a ballot is printed on paper and presented to 
the voter. If the printed ballot reflects the voter’s intent, 
the ballot is saved for future reference [2].  
 
The design of a VEV helps to overcome these difficulties. 
In part, the system uses the idea introduced in [9]. It 
provides a significant improvement to the process of 
electronic voting by publishing the voting results to the 
screen. The system does not involve printers or paper 
receipts. Every user will be able to see the number of 
votes that were cast and the final results for each 
candidate, but only the particular user will know if his/her 
vote was counted and if it was counted correctly.  
 
3. The protocol 
 
There have been a number of conditions that have to be 
met in order to provide voters with a secure electronic 
voting system. This paper includes the description of the 
general steps that needed to be taken in the design of the 
system to provide the user with voting security. The 
requirements for the system are the following:  
 
1. Voting takes place over a computer network 
The electronic voting system is designed to be 
implemented and used over an existing computer network. 
The system includes three major parts: server’s side 
program, client’s (voter) side application and 
administrator’s (administrative user) side software. The 
server-application should be stored and executed on the 
main network computer. The client-application could be 
located either on the main computer or on every network’s 
terminal. It is recommended that, for the security reasons, 
the administrator’s application should be stored on the 
removable storage device (such as floppy, CD), kept 
secure, and run only when changes are being made to the 
voting procedure. The administrator’s software should be 
used with extra caution.  
 
2. Only authorized voters can vote 
Every voter will be assigned a user’s name and a unique 
password. The administrator will be responsible for 
choosing the appropriate values for the name and 
password, since it depends on the election importance as 
well as the election settings, (e.g. students at the Computer 
Science Department might be assigned departmental 
user’s names and their students numbers as passwords; the 
secret service workers can use randomly generated 
numbers as their identification). The administrator has to 
deliver the user’s names and passwords to each eligible 
voter. It is up to the election administrators to decide what 
means of delivery will be chosen (e-mail, regular mail, in 
person). It is assumed that this is done in a very secure 
way. 
 
3. The voter can cast only one vote  
It is important for the system that it allows each voter to 
cast one and only one vote. It is required by the 
democratic election process that there can not be more 
votes cast than there are voters. This system will provide 
the option of a re-vote to each user. Therefore it becomes 
of great importance that the previous vote cast by the 
particular voter will be erased when that user votes again. 
 
4. Only the voter can know his/her vote 
In democratic elections only the voter can know his voting 
strategy: This is the secrecy requirement. There can not be 
a trace left between the voter and the vote and all the links 
should disappear. No one should be able to recognize the 
voter by looking at the ballot. 
 
5. Each voter can check if his/her vote was counted 
There is a great improvement to the electronic voting 
process in VEV. Every user can check if his/her vote is in 
the ballot (which means it has been counted). The system 
will provide the option to check the votes (check the 
ballot), and the voting strategy identification (discussed 
below) will be displayed. Each user can count the votes 
that were cast. He can recognize his vote among the 
displayed votes.  
6. Each voter can change his mind  
When the election process progresses, the voter can 
become aware that he did not vote for the candidate he 
wanted. VEV provides the option to re-vote. It is assumed 
the re-vote is available before the final voting date. The 
user can change his mind multiple times. The system 
supports a multiple re-vote function. Every time the new 
vote is cast the existing vote from that user is erased. 
 
The voting system that is described in this paper uses the 
public-private key paradigm to encrypt information. In 
VEV, the user’s identification number (id) and the voting 
strategy number (v) (which is a numeral representation of 
the candidate’s name) are the two prime numbers that are 
being used. There are three different algorithms designed 
to do calculations with these two prime numbers and 
returning one large number as a result. It is randomly 
chosen in the program which of the three algorithms is 
used when the voting is performed.  
 
 
4. The algorithms 
 
Function 1: 
First function uses multiplication function as the 
underlying calculation. As a result, the product of two 
prime numbers is returned. 
 
Function 2: 
This function calculates the product of two prime 
numbers. It swaps the values of the individual bytes 
within the binary representation of the product (namely 
copies the value of last byte into the byte before the last, 
and the value of the second last byte into the last byte. The 
same swapping operation is done to the third and fourth 
last byte of the product). 
 
Function 3: 
This function calculates the product of two prime 
numbers. It flips (replaces with the complementary value) 
the values of the individual bits within the binary 
representation of the product. The algorithm changes the 
values of bit positions: 3,6,7,12,15. 
 
The fact that both of the prime numbers are randomly 
generated for each user and for each voting strategy 
provides enormous security for the system. The standard 
RSA cryptosystem uses the same p and q throughout its 
lifetime where in the voting system presented here the 
probability that the same two numbers will be used twice 
is very close to zero. The major part of the private key 
constitutes the fact that there exists a system defined index 
that uniquely identifies each candidate. Even if the 
intruder is able to factor the voting strategy function 
result, having two prime numbers would not give him any 
reasonable answer. The secret lies in the knowledge of 
indexing the candidates and having the function inverses. 
For this particular reason the usage of 25-bit long prime 
numbers provides sufficient security to the voting system. 
The prime numbers are being generated using the 
constructor for  BigInteger class from  the Java 
programming language library. The method returns a 
randomly chosen, 25-bit long positive integer which is a 
prime number. The probability that the newly generated 
number represents a prime number will exceed (1 - 
1/2
100
). The execution time of this constructor is 
proportional to the value of the probability parameter 
(which in this case is 100). In addition, each newly created 
number is checked once again by isPrime() function from  
the Java class library.  
 
In the remainder of this paper, the word user will be used 
interchangeably with the word voter to describe the person 
who is casting the vote.  The word server will be used to 
describe the software implemented and executed on the 
network’s main computer and the word client constitutes 
to the computer program that provides the graphical 
interface to the user, and allows for communication 
between the server and the voter. 
 
Phase 1:  Preparation 
VEV (hereafter called system) publishes the number of 
eligible voters and the deadline for the response. In order 
to be able to vote, each voter has to confirm his intention 
to vote and only those who respond will be allowed to cast 
the vote later. There will be a specified period of time 
when the voters can respond.  
Phase 2: Voting Scenario 
When the date for the user’s response passes, the system 
enters the phase of the main voting process. The voting 
system running on the server is constantly waiting for the 
user to connect. The voter starts using the system by 
entering his user name and the password which he 
previously obtained from the system’s administrator. Then 
the system authenticates the user. If the system recognizes 
the user it makes all functionality available to this person 
(such as vote, re-vote or view the existing votes). If the 
voter is not a recognized person (either the user’s name or 
the password does not match the records) he is treated as a 
guest to the system and the only thing that he is able to 
view are the existing votes. If the recognized user chooses 
to cast the vote for the first time the system creates the 
identification number for that user. When the eligible user 
wants to cast a vote for the first time the client software 
will randomly generate a 25-bit long prime number (id) 
which will be used to uniquely identify that particular user 
(that number has to be checked against existing 
identification tags that have been stored already in the 
server’s database; if such a number exists already, a new 
identification tag is generated).   
 
In the next step of casting a vote the user chooses the 
candidate that he wants to vote for. The system displays 
the names of the election candidates and the user chooses 
one of them. The numerical encoding for every voting 
strategy (e.g. name of candidate) is a large prime number. 
VEV is able to handle as many as 24 candidates to be 
voted for. The number 24 provides the opportunity for the 
unique encryption of each voting strategy. First, all 
numbers that end with 1,3,7,9 between 10 and 100 are 
selected (the underlying reason for that is the fact that the 
prime numbers end with 1, 3, 7, 9). This way a set of two 
digit numbers has been created (hereafter called indexes). 
For every index from the set, an election candidate is 
assigned.  When the user chooses to cast a vote for a 
particular candidate, a random 25-bit prime number (v) is 
generated such that the first digit is equal to the first digit 
of the index and the last digit of v is the same as the last 
digit of an index. E.g.: Say we have an election candidate 
Anna S. Initially the system had assigned an index 
identification number to her that is 51. If the voter decides 
to cast the vote for Anna S. the client’s program will 
randomly generate the prime number 5…..1 (first and last 
digit match the index).  
 
Next, the user sends the pair of integers (id, f (id, v)) to the 
system where f is a randomly chosen encryption function 
(one of three algorithms that are explained above); id is 
the identification tag generated for the user, and v is the 
candidate’s name represented in the number; f (id, v) is 
the result of the encrypting method that takes id and v as 
its parameters. The system does not know the connection 
between the user’s name and the id tag (or the voting 
strategy). The only association that is known to the system 
is the connection between the id tag and the vote function 
f (id, v). The user is asked to write down his identification 
number (id) and the result of the voting strategy function. 
He is also informed by the system to keep these numbers 
secret. When the server’s side receives the numbers it 
publishes the voting function result to the screen. The user 
can easily check by choosing the Check Votes option if his 
vote was counted. 
 
For each election candidate the system displays f(id,v) to 
the screen. This way the user can check the correctness of 
his vote and the distribution of all votes. Publishing the 
voting strategy will serve an additional function. Every 
election candidate will be able to check if the votes were 
counted correctly. It might be of a great importance for 
the candidates, because it is known that the elections have 





The primary advantage of public-key cryptography is 
increased security and convenience. The private key never 
needs to be transmitted or revealed to anyone. This section 
explains the major steps that have to be taken in order to 
implement this voting system whose security is based on 
the usage of public-private key paradigm.  It has been 
assumed that the server is running on the main computer 
and is constantly waiting for a client to connect. It is also 
anticipated that every user possesses the knowledge of his 
user’s name and password. The italic type characters will 
be used to indicate the processes occurring on the server’s 
side of the voting system.  
 
6. Main server’s functionality 
 
Pseudo code: 
//second phase: user can vote and re-vote 
The system recognizes the user and chooses the 
correct response depending on user’s input: 
    … 
  switch (state) { 
case VOTE:// user wants to vote 
        create new Vote object 
        outLine = "User wants to vote"; 
        os.println(outLine); 
        //check once more if the user can vote 
         
          while(true){ 
          read the input from the client 
          get the id (prime) from the client’s system; 
          } 
          inString=is.readLine(); 
          BigInteger t = new BigInteger(inString);   
          hash_function = (HashFunc)Oin.readObject(); 
     //set Vote object variables:  
          current.setId(prime); 
          current.setVoteFunction(t1); 
          current.setHash(hash_function); 
          voteStructures.addElement(current); 
   //update the users parameters 
          writeVoteFile(); 
          found.setVotedOnce(true); 
          writeUsersFile(); 
          outLine ="Voting done successfully."; 
        } 
        case PRINTRESULTS: 
        // user wants to print results 
        outLine = "The following are the voting results:"; 
        os.println(outLine); 
        readVoteFile(); 
… 
        case VOTEAGAIN: 
        // User wants to re-vote 
        Create new Vote object 
        readVoteFile(); 
        toChange = this.findPrimeVote(id);//find an 
existing vote 
//change the voting strategy 
  … 
       toChange.setVoteFunction(hash_vote); 
       toChange.setHash(hash_function); 
Step 1: Authentication 
1. Voter starts the execution of the client’s side 
program. 
2. Client asks the user to enter his name. 
3. Server’s side application checks if the name exists on 
the list of users that are eligible to vote. 
4. If the name exists, the user is asked to enter his 
password; otherwise the user is considered to be 
system’s guest. 
5. In case that the user’s name exists, the server checks 
if the password matches the user’s name (if the 
password does not match, the user is considered to be 
the guest). 
 
Step 2: User’s operations 
Phase 1 (the time allocated to acknowledge users’ 
responses with the willingness to vote)  
1. Client displays the names of the users that are eligible 
to cast a vote. 
2. User chooses the option to confirm voting or the 
option to exit. 
3. If user chooses to confirm voting the server records 
user’s willingness to vote. 
4. Client displays the “Thank you” message and informs 
the user about voting dates. 
Phase 2  (the time allocated for the actual voting) 
User chooses to vote 
1. Server checks (using  user’s name and password)  if the 
user  has voted already. 
• If the user did not cast his vote yet, the client 
randomly generates 25-bit long prime number and 
assigns it as an identification number to that 
particular voter.  
• The message is displayed on the screen asking the 
user to take a note of this number and not to reveal it 
to anyone. 
• Client displays the names of the election candidates, 
and asks the user to choose one of them.  
• User types in the number of the candidate for whom 
he wants to cast the vote. 
• Client randomly generates 25-bit long prime number 
called voting strategy, such that it meets the 
specification to match the first and the last digit with 
candidate’s index number (private key requirement). 
• Client performs one of the encrypting functions 
(called also a voting function; there is a random 
choice made to use one of the three available 
encrypting methods) on the user’s identification ta g 
and the voting strategy number.  
• Client displays the voting function to the user. The 
user is asked to write the number down and to keep it 
confidential. 
• Client sends the pair (identification tag, voting 
function result) to the server. 
• Server stores the vote information in its database 
• Server records that the user voted already. It is done 
to prevent the user from casting multiple votes. 
• When the user chooses to exit, client disconnects and 
the link between user’s name and his vote disappears. 
2. If the user previously cast the vote, he is asked to 
choose the re-vote option 
User chooses to re-vote 
1. Client asks the user for his identification tag number. 
2. Client asks the user for his voting function. 
3. Server checks if the vote exists.  
• Client displays the names of the election 
candidates, and asks the user to choose one of 
them.  
• User types in the number of the candidate for 
whom he wants to cast the new vote. 
Client randomly generates 25-bit long voting strategy 
number, such that it meets the specification to match the 
first and the last digit with the candidate’s index number 
(private key requirement). 
• Client performs one of the encrypting functions 
(there is a random choice made to use one of the 
three available encrypting methods) on the user’s 
identification tag and the voting strategy number.  
• Client displays the result of voting function to the 
user. The user is asked to write the number down 
and to keep it confidential. 
• Client sends the pair (identification tag, voting 
function result) to the server. 
• Server stores new vote in its database and erases 
the old vote. 
 
 
User chooses to check the votes 
 
1. Client displays the voting functions for all votes that 
were cast. To make it easier for the user to find his 
vote, the list of votes is displayed in an ascending 
order. 
2. User can check if his vote is in the ballot, which 
means it was counted. 
User chooses to exit 
1. Client displays the “Goodbye” message 
2. Client disconnects from the server 
 
Phase 3 (after voting deadline) 
1. Client displays all the voting functions to the screen. 
The votes are displayed in such a way (see below), 
that for every candidate the voting function numbers 
are displayed in an ascending order. The user can 
check if his vote was counted correctly, and the 




Voting software cannot be treated in the same way as a 
word processor or other applications, as we have even less 
reason to blindly trust the vendor – especially when the 
whole country’s future is at stake. Most of the recent news 
about harnessing electronics for the election process has 
been bad.[8] While much work in the USA is aimed at 
strengthening the ever-tight security around the software 
source code (it has been suggested that the voting 
application source code could not be reviewed even if 
challenged in court), there is a contrary approach whereby  
the voting code is made public, ie released as FLOSS. It is 
often argued [e.g. 10], that the only way to have a 
trustworthy system is to open the source code of 
cryptographic functions to the public. The algorithm can 
really be considered secure when is examined by many 
experts. “… [t]he only way to have any confidence in an 
algorithm's security is to have experts examine it.”[11] 
refuse connection 
[user not recognized] 
record the vote 
display candidates 
check dates [valid for a 
chosen action] 
authenticate 
  return/display result 
Users Candidates Votes Time/Date 
return 
Sequence Diagram for Voting Scenario 
 
Australian officials believe that elections can benefit from 
involving the voters in the software development process. 
Perhaps a truly open system can alleviate some of these 
issues.[9]The voters can dictate the requirements 
including security and functionality of the voting system. 
No matter how many election flaws are found, and despite 
their severity, electronic voting systems are here to stay 
and serve us all. The only question remains: “How much, 
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